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School of Psychology, Bangor University, Bangor, UK
The term ‘contemplative’ is now frequently used in the fast growing field of meditation
research. Yet, there is no consensus regarding the definition of contemplative science.
Meditation studies commonly imply that contemplative practices such as mindfulness
or compassion are the subject of contemplative science. Such approach, arguably,
contributes to terminological confusions in the field, is not conducive to the development
of an overarching theory in contemplative science, and overshadows its unique
methodological features. This paper outlines an alternative approach to defining
contemplative science which aims to focus the research on the core capacities,
processes and states of the mind modified by contemplative practices. It is proposed
that contemplative science is an interdisciplinary study of the metacognitive self-
regulatory capacity (MSRC) of the mind and associated modes of existential awareness
(MEA) modulated by motivational/intentional and contextual factors of contemplative
practices. The MSRC is a natural propensity of the mind which enables introspective
awareness of mental processes and behavior, and is a necessary pre-requisite for
effective self-regulation supporting well-being. Depending on the motivational/intentional
and contextual factors of meditation practice, changes in the metacognitive self-
regulatory processes enable shifts in MEA which determine our sense of self and
reality. It is hypothesized that changes in conceptual processing are essential mediators
between the MSRC, motivational/intentional factors, context of meditation practice,
and the modulations in MEA. Meditation training fosters and fine-tunes the MSRC
of the mind and supports development of motivational/intentional factors with the
ultimate aim of facilitating increasingly advanced MEA. Implications of the proposed
framework for definitions of mindfulness and for future systematic research across
contemplative traditions and practices are discussed. It is suggested that the proposed
definition of contemplative science may reduce terminological challenges in the field
and make it more inclusive of varied contemplative practices. Importantly, this approach
may encourage development of a more comprehensive contemplative science theory
recognizing the essential importance of first- and second-person methods to its inquiry,
thus uniquely contributing to our understanding of the mind.
Keywords: contemplative science, meditation, neuroscience, mindfulness, mechanisms, definition, self-
regulation, awareness
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INTRODUCTION
Research investigating meditation-based techniques has over the
last two decades greatly expanded and grown – not only in
the simple terms of study numbers, but also considering the
variety of meditation techniques investigated, quality of research,
its applications and understanding of possible underlying
mechanisms. While research on mindfulness dominates the
ﬁeld, increasing numbers of studies investigate compassion
(e.g., Pace et al., 2009; Desbordes et al., 2012), visualization-
based meditation practices (e.g., Kozhevnikov et al., 2009),
equanimity (e.g., Desbordes et al., 2014), etc.; and there are also
repeated calls for more studies on non-Buddhist meditation (e.g.,
Dahl et al., 2015). In meditation-based intervention research,
randomized studies with active controls are becoming the
golden standard (e.g., Williams et al., 2014; Malinowski et al.,
2015), and more rigorous meta-analyses are providing stronger
cumulative evidence (e.g., Warren et al., 2016). Understanding
of the possible mechanisms leading to the well-being enhancing
eﬀects of meditation has also improved, particularly due to
theoretical advances (e.g., Shapiro et al., 2006; Garland et al.,
2015) and neurocognitive research (e.g., Tang et al., 2015). All
these developments suggest that the ﬁeld is moving away from
initial questions investigating whether meditation can produce
measurable changes in health and well-being, and toward
increasing research rigor of studies with closer focus on how
meditation techniques modify the mind and brain.
This progression from a nascent to a more mature stage
of meditation research is also starting to highlight some
persistent challenges speciﬁc to the ﬁeld such as terminological
unclarities (e.g., Rosch, 2007; Nash et al., 2013; Lutz et al.,
2015), particular methodological issues (Davidson and Kaszniak,
2015), and a lack of an overarching theory. Many of the
terminological problems relate to diﬀerences in meaning of
constructs within the traditional Buddhist context and current
research – the term ‘mindfulness’ is a prominent example of
this (Williams and Kabat-Zinn, 2013), together with constructs
such as ‘direct perception,’ ‘insight,’ etc. (Rosch, 2007; Dorjee,
2010). Such confusions have tangible implications for research;
for example, if deﬁnitions of mindfulness diﬀer across traditions
is it appropriate to combine studies on secular mindfulness,
studies with Zen practitioners, Insight meditators, and Tibetan
Buddhist practitioners in reviewing the impact of mindfulness on
neurocognitive mechanisms (e.g., Tang et al., 2015)?
The terminological challenges are likely to increase further
as the research on meditation becomes more inclusive of
a broader variety of contemplative1 practices: ranging from
contemplative inquiry and focused meditation on sensory
experience, through mantra recitation and visualization, to
movement and energy-based practices. And even within the
same type of meditation practice such as focused meditation
(Lutz et al., 2008), we are likely to ﬁnd large diﬀerences
according to the context of the practice (e.g., spiritual/religious
1The term contemplation (and its derivatives) is in this article used as inclusive of
meditation, but is considered somewhat broader than meditation since it includes
practices (such as diﬀerent types of prayer or energy movement practices) which
would not be described as meditation in some contemplative traditions.
or secular), object (breath, sacred images, verbal contemplation,
etc.), and format of the contemplative practice (diﬀerent types
of retreat, formal and informal practice). All these variations
could contribute to diﬀerential modulations of psychological
and neurocognitive mechanisms modiﬁed by meditation, but
are easy to overlook if we use broad categories of meditation
types as the subject of research in contemplative science. This
highlights the need for greater distinctions between practices,
their processes and outcomes, combined with a requirement to
integrate the similarities and diﬀerences between ﬁndings into
a strong discipline-speciﬁc theoretical framework. Accordingly,
increasing numbers of theoretical studies are trying to address
deﬁnitional (e.g., Vago and Silbersweig, 2012) and classiﬁcation
issues in meditation research (Lutz et al., 2008; Josipovic, 2010;
Travis and Shear, 2010; Nash et al., 2013; Dahl et al., 2015).
Aside from terminological and classiﬁcation challenges,
there are methodological issues speciﬁc to the ﬁeld of
contemplative science. The main one relates to the introspective
dimension of contemplative practices and associated diﬃculty
in capturing the ﬁrst-person and second-person data. The ﬁrst-
person information refers to the phenomenological ‘what it is
like’ aspects of practitioner’s meditation experience only the
practitioner has access to. The second-person data is usually
provided by an experienced meditation practitioner, often a
teacher, who can report in an informed way on another’s, usually
a student’s, phenomenological aspects of practice experience.
These types of data also need to be meaningfully linked with
third person data from behavioral, physiological, and imaging
measurements (Varela, 1996; Davidson and Kaszniak, 2015; Lutz
et al., 2015). Another methodological challenge is associated with
the context of contemplative practices (their secular, spiritual,
and religious aspects) which is increasingly acknowledged in
theory as an important factor modulating the outcomes and
mechanisms (e.g., Shapiro et al., 2006; Dorjee, 2010), but is very
rarely considered and assessed in empirical research. As a result,
most studies take a limited view of meditation focused on a
particular practice taken out of a complex contemplative system,
without a more systemic perspective of the role the practice plays
in a person’s life-long trajectory of well-being and purpose.
Interestingly, all these terminological, theoretical, and
methodological challenges seem to point to the same
fundamental limitation of the ﬁeld which remains unaddressed –
the lack of deﬁnitional clarity about contemplative science and its
subject. Most current studies of meditation implicitly assume that
the contemplative practices themselves (often without distinction
equated with processes and outcomes they produce) are the
subject of contemplative science research. This fundamental
assumption might be at the core of the challenges contemplative
science is currently facing. For example, if mindfulness (or any
other contemplative practice) as a practice, capacity, process,
or outcome is the main subject of contemplative science, the
deﬁnitional diﬃculties associated with the term ‘mindfulness’
are of principal importance. However, if the main subject of
contemplative science is deﬁned in terms of an overarching
(practice non-speciﬁc) capacity, process or state of the mind,
the terminological problems arising from disparate deﬁnitions
of contemplative practices are of secondary importance –
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diﬃculties of terminology associated with deﬁning practices
can be greatly reduced by clear instructional descriptions of
particular practices and processes or outcomes they aim to
produce. Similarly, if contemplative science is deﬁned in terms
of mental or cognitive constructs non-speciﬁc to particular
contemplative practices (to avoid equating the discipline and
its subject with contemplative practices), this would focus
investigations on underlying similarities and diﬀerences (in
terms of mechanisms) across practices, thus contribute to
advancement of an integrative contemplative science theory. In
addition, deﬁning the subject in terms of mental or cognitive
constructs could create theoretical bridges enabling focused
considerations about the unique potential of contemplative
science in contributing more broadly to research in cognitive
science and psychology. Finally, such deﬁnition of contemplative
science could also help clarify the methodological focus of the
discipline – if the formulation of the discipline’s subject clearly
highlights the importance of studying the experiential dimension
of mental functioning and context of contemplative practice,
this will necessitate the integration of ﬁrst- and second-person
approaches and considerations about contemplative context
into its core methodology. In line with this approach, this paper
proposes one possible deﬁnition of contemplative science and its
subject.
DEFINING CONTEMPLATIVE SCIENCE
The Metacognitive Self-Regulatory
Capacity of the Mind
Self-Regulation and Contemplative Practice
Enhancement of self-regulation (SR) as the ability to notice and
eﬀectively manage thoughts, emotional responses, and behavior
has been highlighted as the main neurocognitive mechanism of
mindfulness – the most studied meditation technique (Hölzel
et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2015). Setting aside the widely debated
diﬀerences in deﬁnitions of mindfulness (‘sati’ in Pali), the core
SR processes of orienting, shifting, and sustaining attention
combined with metacognitive awareness (‘sampajanna’ in Pali,
Thera, 1998; Wallace, 1999a) are emphasized in most deﬁnitions
of mindfulness. They are also considered essential pre-requisites
for any meditation practice in the Buddhist context. This makes
the construct of SR broadly applicable to all contemplative
research. However, SR is also a construct used within and
outside of contemplative research, which highlights the need to
specify how meditation practices could distinctively engage SR
(Figure 1).
Self-regulation is in psychological research typically deﬁned in
terms of adaptive goal-directed attention regulation (including
directing, shifting, and sustaining of attention; Hofmann et al.,
2012) and emotion regulation (enabling modulation of responses
to emotional stimuli; Gross and Thompson, 2007) – processes
essential to eﬀective modulation of behavior and in social
interactions.2 Such deﬁnition of SR seems equally relevant to
2Another framework of self-regulation developed by Baumeister and Heatherton
(1996) is commonly applied in clinical/health psychology context. This approach
FIGURE 1 | Core systems and processes modified by contemplative
training. The metacognitive self-regulatory capacity of the mind (MSCM)
consists of interacting systems and processes of metacognition and attention,
emotion regulation, and conceptual processing. Cumulative changes in the
MSCM enable shifts in modes of existential awareness (MEA). Both changes
in the MSCM and shifts in MEA are modulated by motivational/intentional and
contextual factors of contemplative practice. Motivational/intentional factors
can also be impacted by the shifts in MEA, and to some extent modulated by
changes in the MSCM. Changes in the MSCM and associated shifts in MEA
further modify the sympathetic/parasympathetic balance of the autonomic
nervous system (ANS) which mediates their impact on physical well-being.
Mostly via the neuroendocrine mechanisms of the
hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis, the ANS changes also impact
Metacognition and Attention, Emotion Regulation, and Conceptual
Processing.
contemplative science research, but contemplative training
particularly emphasizes a speciﬁc aspect of SR rarely considered
in psychological research – the introspective metacognition
(awareness and knowledge of bodily sensations, mental
phenomena, and behavior). This is where many meditation
techniques seem to engage SR distinctively from other methods
of SR training since noticing immediate thoughts, feelings,
perceptions, aﬀect, and behavior, as well as noticing overarching
patterns of these is their hallmark.
Emotion Regulation in Contemplative Context
Another aspect of SR particularly targeted by contemplative
practices aims to develop speciﬁc emotional qualities and
emotion regulation strategies. These emotion regulation
processes closely build on the skills of attention control,
sustained attention, and metacognition and also impact these
(see links between Metacognition/Attention and Emotion
has not been considered in recent research on mindfulness/meditation and self-
regulation (e.g., Tang et al., 2015), which might be due to diﬃculty in translating
some psychological constructs, such as ‘standards,’ etc., proposed in this theory into
cognitive and neurocognitive constructs. The current paper stays within the self-
regulation framework typically discussed in meditation research.
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Regulation in Figure 1). The qualities of acceptance and non-
reactivity are most often highlighted in meditation research
(e.g., Bishop et al., 2004; Baer et al., 2008) together with positive
emotions of loving kindness and compassion (e.g., Hofmann
et al., 2011). Some traditions equally emphasize sympathetic joy
and equanimity (Wallace, 1999b). Contemplative training in
cultivation of these qualities and emotions typically encourages
development of unique emotion regulation strategies involving
aﬀective labeling, visualization, reﬂective contemplations,
transformation of negative emotions into their positive emotion
‘antidotes,’ etc. There are many important diﬀerences across
contemplative traditions in terms of their emphasis on particular
qualities, emotions, and strategies. There are also diﬀerences
in terms of practices leading to their cultivation (e.g., secular
mindfulness-based approaches train in loving kindness and
compassion mostly implicitly; Tibetan Buddhist schools use a
variety of explicit conceptual and visualization-based practices
training diﬀerent degrees of loving kindness, compassion,
rejoicing, and equanimity; and distinct practices, some of them
visualization-based, are applied in Christian contemplative
training of the Ignatian tradition). These variations deserve
much more attention in research than they have received so far,
but the overarching emphasis on cultivation of certain positive
aﬀective states and traits is another feature of SR unique to this
construct within the contemplative science context.
Conceptual Processing, Self-Regulation, and
Contemplative Practice
A further aspect of SR, which is typically not considered
in psychological models of SR, and rarely considered in
meditation research, is the contribution of language processes,
and more broadly conceptual processing, to SR. For instance,
Farb et al. (2010) found that novices to meditation showed
higher activation in left prefrontal and Wernicke regions of
the brain (possibly due to rumination) associated with higher
depression scores in comparison to participants who completed a
mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) course. In a cross-
sectional study, Pagnoni et al. (2008) reported less activation
in areas involved in conceptual processing in Zen meditators
in comparison to non-meditators in a lexical decision task.
And in a dispositional study Dorjee et al. (2015) found a
positive association between trait mindfulness and the N400
eﬀect to negative targets of aﬀective word pairs suggesting less
frequent access of negative word meanings in more mindful
individuals.
Such changes in language processing might be viewed as
consequential to enhancements in attention and emotion related
SR. However, they could equally reﬂect distinct engagement with
conceptual processing targeted by contemplative practices, for
example when meditation encourages non-elaborative awareness
of thoughts (with thoughts most often overtly and covertly
expressed in language), which could release more cognitive
resources for SR. In addition, some meditation techniques
involve focused contemplations on topics such as impermanence
(involving overt or silent speech), and other meditations
teach neutral language for labeling of experience, use mantra
recitations, or encourage complex non-verbal visualizations.
These targeted modulations of language/conceptual processing
most likely uniquely contribute to the SR changes resulting
from meditation. Therefore, conceptual processing needs to
be singled out as one of the mechanisms of SR modiﬁed
by meditation and can both be directly impacted by and
directly impact on metacognition, attention, and emotion
regulation processes (see links between Conceptual Processing,
Metacognition, and Attention and Emotion Regulation in
Figure 1).
Motivational/Intentional and Contextual Factors
Self-regulation in the context of meditation research is also
intrinsically linked to motivational/intentional3 and contextual
factors (Shapiro et al., 2006; Dorjee, 2010; Vago and Silbersweig,
2012). For instance, some practitioners may engage in
contemplative practice to learn how to cope with stress or
better regulate chronic pain, whilst for others engagement
in contemplative practice may be a way to ﬁnd existential
meaning and purpose. Importantly, the motivational/intentional
factors are in the contemplative context closely linked to the
broader philosophical context of a practice and particularly to
ethics – cultivation of states and qualities considered virtuous
within a speciﬁc contemplative framework. Dahlsgaard et al.
(2005) suggested possible convergence on a few core virtues
across contemplative traditions, but there are inevitably also
important diﬀerences. Some contemplative traditions include
clear speciﬁcations of faculties, qualities, and states as virtuous,
non-virtuous, and neutral (Thera, 1998). Contemplative
training accordingly targets development of virtuous qualities
and states, and reduction of non-virtuous ones (Dreyfus,
2002), as determined by broader motivational/intentional
factors.
The speciﬁcation of motivational/intentional factors is often
closely linked with broader context of contemplative practice,
most notably practicing within a certain tradition with its
speciﬁc philosophical views shaping the perceptions and goals
of the practice. Another salient aspect relates to practicing
within a structured ordained contemplative context which
typically focuses on explicit motivational/intentional factors
(whether monastic or non-monastic), whereas outside of
structured context of traditional contemplative training the
motivational/intentional factors are typically less speciﬁed and
emphasized. While some of these motivational/intentional
and contextual factors have been theoretically highlighted in
meditation research (Shapiro et al., 2006; Dorjee, 2010, 2013),
they are rarely considered in experimental studies evaluating
eﬀectiveness and mechanisms of meditation. Our understanding
3In the context of meditation research the term ‘intention,’ rather than ‘motivation,’
is more frequently used (e.g., Shapiro et al., 2006). For example Shapiro (1992)
suggested developmental progression of intention from self-regulation, through
self-exploration to self-liberation as a result of continuous meditation practice.
In the framework proposed here, it is suggested that motivational factors need
to be included in conjunction with intentional factors, primarily as a means to
connect this aspect of contemplative science investigation with existing theories
and empirical research on motivation theory in psychology and cognitive science
(e.g., similarities and diﬀerences between humanistic theories of motivation and
motivational factors in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition of Dzogchen are considered
in Dorjee, 2013)
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of the progression of motivational/intentional factors with long-
term contemplative practice is also very limited (e.g., Shapiro,
1992). In some contemplative traditions such as in Mahayana
Buddhism, a progression from self-focused to self-transcending
motivation/intentions is explicitly encouraged (Dorjee, 2013).
Overall, the motivational/intentional and contextual factors
likely signiﬁcantly modulate practitioners’ engagement with
contemplative practices and resulting changes in SR (see
links with Metacognition and Attention, Emotion Regulation
and Conceptual Processing in Figure 1). Modulations in SR,
particularly changes in conceptual schemas relevant to self-
construal and values, can also impact onmotivational/intentional
factors.
Postulating the Metacognitive Self-Regulatory
Capacity of the Mind
In sum, contemplative practices seem to distinctively
improve attention and introspective metacognition4 of mental
contents/processes and behavior. They also cultivate particular
aﬀective states, traits, and emotion regulation strategies, and
uniquely modify conceptual processing. These cognitive,
aﬀective, and conceptual states, traits and processes can be
considered features of an overarching natural capacity of the
mind, speciﬁcally termed here ‘the metacognitive self-regulatory
capacity (MSRC) of the mind,’ which contemplative training
aims to enhance. This capacity enables reﬂective meta-awareness
of mental phenomena and behavior and their adaptive5 (well-
being conducive) modulation. The processes of the MSRC are
modiﬁed by motivational/intentional and contextual factors of
contemplative practices (Figure 1).
While the MSRC is considered here as an umbrella term,
the particular pattern of changes in the MSRC resulting
from speciﬁc contemplative training will likely diﬀer across
contemplative practices and traditions. All meditation practices
enhance to some degree metacognitive awareness and attention
control since these are foundational to any meditation practice.
But contemplations on a certain topic (e.g., impermanence)
may also distinctively engage language systems with implied
impact on motivational/intentional factors and emotion
regulation. In comparison, visualization-based practices may
enhance visuo-spatial conceptual processing (e.g., Kozhevnikov
et al., 2009) and reduce activation in language areas with
indirect impact on emotion regulation in a broader spiritual
development framework. Mindfulness-based approaches
may modify involvement of language areas through their
emphasis on non-elaborative processing and sensory focus
(e.g., Farb et al., 2010), and more directly target development
4Attention, particularly attention control, and metacognition are to some extent
overlapping processes (see for example Malinowski, 2013). Here they are singled
out separately to highlight introspective metacognition as a unique aspect of self-
regulation speciﬁcally targeted by contemplative practices.
5In the contemplative context the interpretation of what is considered ‘adaptive’
may strongly depend on the motivational/intentional factors and contemplative
context of a practice and in some aspects diverge from standard psychological
understanding in terms of situational or goal-directed appropriateness; the notion
of well-being conduciveness is often linked to speciﬁc understanding of virtue and
non-virtue within a contemplative system.
of speciﬁc adaptive emotion regulation strategies in the secular
context, etc.
Modulations of the Autonomic Nervous System
Enhancements in the MSRC resulting from contemplative
practice can also have tangible eﬀects on physiological processes
associated with well-being and health (see links between
Metacognition and Attention, Emotion Regulation, Conceptual
Processing, and autonomic nervous system (ANS) in Figure 1).
These have been so far mostly studied in terms of modulations
in the sympathetic/parasympathetic balance of the ANS linked
to hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis activation during
the stress response. The initial evidence suggests that two main
indexes of both acute and chronic stress might be modulated
by contemplative practice – these are cortisol levels as a marker
of endocrine stress response and heart-rate variability (HRV)
indexes of sympathetic/parasympathetic balance. For example,
amount of meditation practice has been negatively related to the
levels of morning cortisol suggesting less chronic stress (Brand
et al., 2012). However, ﬁndings on the eﬀects of MBAs on cortisol
levels are mixed (O’Leary et al., 2015). Initial ﬁndings on changes
in HRV indexes reported increases in high frequency HRV, a
biomarker of parasympathetic activity, after 10 days of Vipassana
training (Krygier et al., 2013).
Yet, very few studies examined actual links between
modulations in ANS activity and neurocognitive processes of
the MSRC with contemplative practice – a study by Tang et al.
(2009) was one of rare exceptions. They found an association
between an EEG index of ACC activity and high frequency
HRV in a group trained in integrative mind-body training
(which includes mindfulness practices). No studies have so
far explored how sympathetic/parasympathetic balance as such
could impact on engagement with contemplative practice and
associated changes in the MSRC (see reciprocal links with ANS
in Figure 1). Similarly, no studies investigated links between ANS
activation and intentional/motivational and contextual factors of
contemplative practices.
Investigation of similarities as well as diﬀerential modulations
of the MSRC (its processes and outcomes) by contemplative
practices together with their motivational/intentional and
contextual factors and their implications for modulations of the
ANS balance can be considered one of the two essential goals of
contemplative science. The second (not less important) goal of
contemplative science is to investigate phenomenological shifts
in the awareness of self and reality resulting from contemplative
practices. We will now examine the current empirical evidence
and theoretical foundations of these meditation-speciﬁc changes
in awareness.
Modes of Existential Awareness
Changes in Self-Construal with Meditation: Current
Approaches and Their Limitations
Modiﬁcations in the awareness and construal of self and reality
are often highlighted as the essential aims of contemplative
practices across traditions (Dahl et al., 2015). Yet, Western
scientiﬁc understanding of associated processes, states, and traits
is very limited. For example, Farb et al. (2007) investigated
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changes in self-referential awareness by comparing narrative
construal of self with present-moment sensory experience
focus in participants who completed an MBSR course and
novices to meditation (Farb et al., 2007). The ﬁndings revealed
increased activation in the right insular cortex and somatosensory
cortex for the mindfulness group in the present-moment
condition. This suggests diﬀerential activation between the
narrative and present-moment modes which seems enhanced
further by mindfulness training. It is, however, not clear
to what extent these ﬁndings mostly reﬂect diﬀerences in
attention focus (bodily sensations vs. narration) during the two
instructions rather than diﬀerences in the actual construal of
self.
Perhaps closer to investigating speciﬁc shifts in self-construal
with meditation, a recent study examined neural correlates
associated with non-reactivity to self-praise and self-criticism
in long-term mindfulness meditators and meditation novices
(Lutz et al., 2016). The results showed increased activation
in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (possibly reﬂecting greater
regulation of emotions) and decreased connectivity between this
area and other regions in the default mode network in meditators
compared to novices. The later ﬁnding was interpreted as an
indicator of less self-focus in meditators, manifesting as less
reactivity. The authors, however, acknowledge the diﬃculty
in distinguishing between emotion-speciﬁc and self-referential
eﬀects in their results and argue that these might be closely
interconnected, so are hard to tease apart.
Other meditation studies evaluated more spontaneous self-
related processing by measuring the default mode of brain
function (Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle and Snyder, 2007) which is
typically assessed using functional magnetic resonance imaging
while participants are simply resting or ﬁxating their gaze on a
cross on the screen. This encourages engagement in spontaneous
‘default’ mode processing which for most people seems to involve
mind-wandering (random oﬀ task activity). In a study with
experienced meditators and meditation novices, Brewer et al.
(2011) found that during resting as well as during meditation,
meditators showed stronger connectivity between the posterior
cingulate, dorsal anterior cingulate, and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortices. This suggests better self-monitoring and cognitive
control in meditators. In addition, ﬁndings of deactivation in
the core areas of the default mode network (medial prefrontal
and posterior cingulate cortices) during resting and during three
diﬀerent meditation practices (concentration, loving kindness,
choiceless awareness) were interpreted as less mind-wandering in
meditators. Similarly, Taylor et al. (2013) found that meditators
had decreased connectivity between medial prefrontal cortex
(associated with mind-wandering and self-referential processing)
and other regions. While these results are certainly novel
and interesting, again, it is not clear what aspects of the
brain activation diﬀerences are distinctively relevant to self-
construal andwhich reﬂectmore overarching attention processes.
Particularly the result of no diﬀerential modulations across three
meditation types and the resting state in the Brewer et al.
(2011) study indicates that the brain activation pattern most
likely reﬂected similar regulation of attention processes, rather
than self-referential processing. This is because the practice
of choiceless awareness closely targeting self-related processes
would be expected to more selectively reduce self-construal
related activity than focused attention (Lutz et al., 2008).
So despite the increasing numbers of studies investigating
modulations in self-referential processes with meditation,
implications of these ﬁndings for our understanding of changes
in the self-construal resulting from meditation seem limited.
The observation of overlap between brain activations associated
with emotion and self-reference in research on meditation (Lutz
et al., 2016), just like the diﬃculty in dissociating attention (Farb
et al., 2007) or mind-wandering (Taylor et al., 2011; Brewer et al.,
2013) and self-referential processes in other meditation studies,
raise a key question for this type of research in contemplative
science: Is the construal of self a mere accumulation of other,
mostly attention, emotion, andmemory related processes? This is
the approach commonly applied in cognitive and neuroscientiﬁc
research on self-reference (Northoﬀ et al., 2006), and most
current meditation studies seem to assume that it is equally
appropriate for investigating changes in construal of self with
contemplative practices. But some contemplative traditions
provide descriptions of radical deconstructing of the usual self-
referential processing with contemplative practices. Can such
changes be meaningfully captured using the traditional cognitive
and neuroscientiﬁc methods?
A study by Josipovic (2014) was the ﬁrst aiming to investigate
the more advanced shifts in self-focus by examining neural
correlates of awareness states characterized by greatly diminished
diﬀerentiation between subject and object of experience (non-
duality) in experienced meditators. The ﬁndings indicated
clear diﬀerences between brain activation patterns in focused
meditation and non-dual awareness meditation, thus dissociating
the two. However, once more it is not clear to what extent
these diﬀerences were the result of implementing distinct types
of meditation with diﬀerent objects of attention focus. The
main result highlighted an increase in functional connectivity
between the central precuneus and dlPFC which was interpreted
as a possible index of gradients in non-dual awareness. This
hypothesis might be so far the closest to speciﬁc postulation of
neural changes associated with modulations in the self-construal
with meditation.
Perhaps the lack of research evidence directly pertaining to
the changes in self-construal with meditation is due to one
key aspect of these states being omitted in the majority of
previous investigations of self-referencing in meditators. This
component relates to the experiential felt ‘what it is like’ aspect of
changes in the self-construal. If we capture the phenomenological
shifts in the self-construal, we might be able to investigate
the core distinctive features of self-construal states rather than
attention, emotion, memory, or other processes which support
the self-referencing states, but are not speciﬁc or deﬁnitional
to them. Such phenomenological reports would enable the
assessment of links with modulations in behavioral or neural
markers, while contributions of emotion, attention, or other
cognitive processing are controlled for. A recent study by Dor-
Ziderman et al. (2016) was the ﬁrst step toward this approach;
it captured the phenomenological aspects of self-construal by
inviting meditators to describe their sense of self-boundaries
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and being separate from external world. Associations between
three distinct self-construal states and neural correlates were
then investigated using magnetoencephalogram, with ﬁndings
highlighting changes in the right lateralized beta oscillations
in the temporo-parietal junction and in the medial parietal
cortex. However, given the lack of an overarching theory of
phenomenological states associated with self-construal, it is
currently diﬃcult to position these ﬁndings within a range of such
states resulting from meditation training.
Hence, an essential pre-requisite for future testing of
any hypotheses about changes in the self-construal with
meditation seems to be a systematic capture of ﬁrst-person
phenomenological reports on gradients of self-construal
grounded in a comprehensive theory of such states. This
approach will necessitate further development of suitable ﬁrst-
person and second-person research methods which would be
particularly suited for research in contemplative science (see
section “Deﬁnitions of Mindfulness and Other Contemplative
Practices” for further discussion). It will also require development
of a comprehensive theory which would describe diﬀerences in
self-referential processing expected with increasing proﬁciency
in speciﬁc types of contemplative practices, and how these
shifts could relate to self-regulatory processing and well-being.
Such theory would provide grounding and guidance for further
systematic and focused empirical investigations of changes in the
construal of self with meditation.
Postulating Modes of Existential Awareness
In the proposed framework of contemplative science it is
suggested that cumulative changes in the attentional, aﬀective,
and conceptual aspects of metacognitive self-regulatory
processes modulated by motivational/intentional and contextual
factors of meditation practice enable more overarching,
phenomenologically distinct, state shifts in the awareness
of self and reality (Figure 1). These shifts are termed here
‘modes of existential awareness’ (MEA) to encompass both
the experiential modulations in the construal of self and in
experiential understanding of the construed nature of reality.
They phenomenologically reﬂect personal existential schemas of
meaning and purpose in life, that’s why they are best described as
‘existential.’ Meditation training is associated with a progression
of shifts in MEA. For example, in the Buddhist context of the
Dzogchen tradition, the initial MEA are associated with the
‘ordinary mind’ characterized by a construal of self and reality
which is heavily determined by our cognitions, habits, personal
history, culture, and society. The same tradition describes that
at the most advanced stages of meditation training the MEA
involve insight into the nature of mind and reality characterized
by experiential recognition/knowing and abiding in experiential
ground from which self and reality are construed (‘rigpa’ –
pristine awareness, Gyaltrul andWallace, 1998; Padmasambhava,
2007).
There are many additional MEA between the two extreme
end points (Figure 2). These could involve a progression
of states characterized by increasing development of self-
reﬂective awareness and self-inquiry of the ﬂeeting nature
of mental phenomena, then ﬁrst intellectual understanding
FIGURE 2 | The figure outlines the progression in MAE as states
associated with increasing gradients of dereification (processes).
Further MAE can be described between the MAE states highlighted in the
figure (together with associated dereification gradients). Some types of
contemplative training may bypass certain MAE (e.g., Tibetan Buddhist
traditions typically do not engage in the training of the form and formless
absorptions).
of the construed notions of self, followed by experiential
realization of the emptiness of self and ﬁnally non-dual state of
pristine awareness (Dorjee, 2013). Looking more closely at the
underlying processes, the accumulation of the initial experiences
of impermanence can lead to loosening up of the usual self-
construal which is at ﬁrst still rooted in conceptual distinctions
about what self is and isn’t. This is enabled by increasing levels
of stability in MSCM, which in some meditation traditions
culminates in the experience of form and formless absorptions
(Sanskrit: Dhya¯na; Pali: Jha¯na). Such states, however, are not
considered as stages of actual liberation because of their focus
on concentration rather than insight into the nature of self and
reality (e.g., Gampopa, 1998).
The emptiness of ‘self ’ is further realized through purely
experiential comprehension which releases the conceptual
constructs of self and non-self. The most advanced mode of
existential awareness (in Dzogchen termed as rigpa – pristine
awareness; Dalai Lama, 2000) experientially transcends the
notions of self through the dissolution of the duality between
the observer and the observed and encompasses the experiential
realization of the nature of mind and reality. It is a non-
conceptual state with a clear sense of knowing (which can be
considered paradoxical from the ‘ordinary mind’ perspective
where all knowledge is conceptual) and pervasive non-referential
experience of compassion. One of the key future tasks of
contemplative science is to provide a clear theory of the MEA
progression which could then be empirically tested. Such research
needs to emphasize the intrinsically phenomenological nature
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of MEA and take into account the limitations of research
methodologies in capturing the non-conceptual nature of more
advanced MEA.
The only MEA which has so far been investigated in
meditation research is decentering which could be considered
one of the initial stages in the MEA progression. Decentering
(Fresco et al., 2007) has been described as the awareness of mental
events experienced as observing thoughts and feelings as ﬂeeting
mental phenomena rather than unchangeable facts. Decentering
plays pivotal role in therapeutic eﬀects of mindfulness-based
approaches (Bieling et al., 2012; Hoge et al., 2015), and is
particularly emphasized in mindfulness-based cognitive therapy
(MBCT; Teasdale, 1999). Speciﬁcally, in research on recurrent
depression the term ‘metacognitive insight’ has been used to
label this therapeutically salient shift in individual perspective
on elements of own cognition (Teasdale et al., 1995, Teasdale
et al., 2002). In a similar way, Shapiro et al. (2006) and
Carmody et al. (2009), use the term ‘reperceiving’ to denote
the modiﬁcation in perspective on mental events and suggest
that reperceiving is the core primary mechanism underlying the
beneﬁcial eﬀects of mindfulness with other clinically signiﬁcant
mechanisms such as exposure or changes in SR and cognitive
ﬂexibility being derivative. Recent psychophysiological research
partially supports this hypothesis – Eddy et al. (2015) found that
decentering as a state (but not mindfulness) was associated with
less demand on cognitive resources in processing of emotional
images in healthy adults. It is also possible that even within the
construct of decentering we could diﬀerentiate further distinct
MEA, this option has not been investigated so far. Similarly, it
is not clear whether secular mindfulness-based approaches could
enable a progression beyond initial stages of MEA.
Conceptual Processing and Modes of Existential
Awareness
Enhancements in the MSRC of the mind can be considered
pre-requisites for all shifts in MEA since these shifts require
increasing levels of attentional stability, cultivation of certain
aﬀective qualities and emotions (such as compassion and
sympathetic joy), clariﬁcation of personal motivation/intention
for engaging in contemplative practice and volitional monitoring
and regulation of elaborative conceptual processing.6 The
contribution of conceptual processing to shifts in MEA is likely
pivotal in this process and is not limited to improved volitional
control of rumination (as a support of non-elaborative awareness,
discussed in section “TheMetacognitive Self-Regulatory Capacity
of the Mind”). Concepts are the fundamental building blocks of
cognition and of particular importance here is the ‘intentionality
of concepts’ as their property of representing entities whilst
being detached from them. In the context of contemplative
research John Dunne (2012) proposed the term ‘dereiﬁcation’
to describe the explicit experiential awareness of the distinction
between the actual objects and conceptual representations of
the objects. Increasing gradients of dereiﬁcation, starting with
6In the context of Dzogchen, the purpose of practices enhancing the MSRC of the
mind could be described in terms of settling the ‘ordinary mind’ so that more
advanced MEA can be recognized. The intentional/motivational and contextual
factors can be viewed as essential catalysts in this process.
enabling initial decentering from mental states up to the most
advanced dereiﬁcation of ways we conceptualize reality, can be
hypothesized as the main mediators (or underlying processes) of
shifts in MEA (Figure 2).
The conceptual changes mediating shifts in MEA can to
some extent be further elucidated by a theory underlying the
postulation of metacognitive insight in MBCT which builds on
the Interactive Cognitive Subsystems Framework (ICS) (e.g.,
Barnard and Teasdale, 1991). The ICS distinguishes between
speciﬁc propositional meanings expressed in language and more
holistic, language non-speciﬁc, implicational meanings described
as generic schematic experiential patterns, with both types
of meanings continuously interacting.7 Importantly, Teasdale
(1999) linked this distinction to metacognitive knowledge
supported by propositional meanings and metacognitive insight
which can only arise at the level of implicational meaning
representations. In the context of MBCT, through metacognitive
insight a practitioner develops a new implicational schema
for mapping perceptions and thoughts onto reality which can
reduce depressive relapse through decentering from negative
propositional meanings and implicational schemas. In other
words, metacognitive insight enables initial level of experiential
understanding of the ‘intentionality of concepts.’ This supports
the development of a mode of existential awareness associated
with initial stages of dereiﬁcation. Beyond the context of
MBCT and with further contemplative training, particularly
in the deconstructive family of meditation practices (Dahl
et al., 2015), a practitioner can experience shifts toward
more advanced MEA encompassing further remapping of
implicational meanings associated with deeper experiential
understanding of dereiﬁcation.
Are Modes of Existential Awareness States or Traits?
The links between gradients of dereiﬁcation (considered here as
processes) and MEA (which have been here so far described as
states), raises the question about stability of these shifts. Are they
only transient insights or could they become more stable states
and traits? In the traditional contemplative context, they can be
both depending on depth and stability of one’s contemplative
practice (Dorjee, 2013). Most novices to meditation practice
may experience initial insights of decentering within few weeks
or months of their practice, but will not be able to stabilize
the state. Further deepening and stabilization of increasingly
advanced shifts in MEA will come with ongoing practice
under proper guidance. There can also be instances of sudden
immediate insight into most advanced MEA, such as those
experienced in ‘cutting through’ practices of Dzogchen, but for
most practitioners these too will need to be stabilized and
sustained with further practice up to the point where they can
be considered a stable trait. Such stabilization can happen at any
mode (also considered here as a stage) of existential awareness
associated with any degree of dereiﬁcation (including lack of it
which would be associated with stagnation in progress to more
advanced MEA).
7The ICS suggests that implicational meanings are linked to emotional aspects of
experience whereas propositional meanings are not – a somewhat controversial
claim which is not of essence here.
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In general, the progression in MEA with further practice is
in contemplative theory associated with higher levels of well-
being. However, progression from one MEA onto another, more
advanced one, can also sometimes be accompanied by temporary
psychological states which could be in the Western psychological
or psychiatric context considered adverse or pathological. Such
states are clearly outlined in the contemplative literature as
temporary signs of shifts in meditative experience together with
instructions on how to work with such experiences (e.g., Wallace,
2011). This highlights the essential importance of guidance by
experienced qualiﬁed meditation teachers when engaging in
practices targeting the progression ofMEA in one’s contemplative
training.
Overall, investigation of the shifts in MEA with meditation
training has perhaps been the most elusive part of research
in contemplative science so far, yet it seems the most
central and unique to the discipline. The proposed framework
aims to stimulate further investigation in this underexplored
area of contemplative science research through postulating
initial theoretical distinctions in MEA and their mediation by
dereiﬁcation of intentionality of concepts. The modulation of
MEA by motivational/intentional and contextual factors will be
of particular interest in future studies, especially in investigations
of similarities and diﬀerences in MEA across contemplative
approaches. Given the central standing of shifts in MEA in
traditional contemplative training, such investigations could
provide impactful new insights advancing contemplative science
theory with further implications for applied research.
The Proposed Definition of
Contemplative Science
The discussion in preceding sections highlighted the necessity of
deﬁning contemplative science in terms of overarching cognitive
and mental capacities, processes and states – the MSRC of the
mind and MEA were considered as the possible key deﬁnitional
constructs. These considerations imply that contemplative
science can be deﬁned as an integrative interdisciplinary study
of the MSRC of the mind (which contemplative training
aims to enhance) and associated MEA (states and traits of
awareness resulting from contemplative training characterized by
increasing gradients of dereiﬁcation), with both modulated by
motivational/intentional and contextual factors of contemplative
practice. Changes in conceptual processing, particularly in
implicational meanings, are likely mediators between changes
in the MSRC and shifts in MEA. First- and second-person
methods will be essential to mapping the shifts in MEAs and
conceptual processing, hence are central to the methodology of
contemplative science. We will now explore the methodological
implications of the proposed deﬁnition in more detail.
Research Methodology of Contemplative
Science
Contemplative science is inherently an interdisciplinary ﬁeld
of study due to the multifaceted nature of its subject which
includes both complex mental processes and states and their
contemplative context involving historical, cultural, and societal
factors. So far, meditation research has been mostly building
on standard research methods in psychology and cognitive
neuroscience. This approach seems appropriate for the core
components of the MSRC of the mind – attention and emotion
regulation, and conceptual processes. It is also suitable for
investigations of the impact changes in MSCM can have on
the balance of the ANS. From amongst the components of
MSRC, previous research on meditation mostly studied attention
processes and emotion regulation (e.g., Hölzel et al., 2011; Tang
et al., 2015). Studies on changes in introspective metacognition
(e.g., Teasdale et al., 2002; Jankowski and Holas, 2014) and
conceptual processing with meditation (e.g., Pagnoni et al., 2008;
Dorjee et al., 2015) are, however, limited.
For research in contemplative science to move toward a more
comprehensive contemplative science theory, the modulations
in processes of MSRC need to be studied systematically and
simultaneously whenever possible. In most studies this is a
realistic option since multiple experimental tasks and self-report
measures are often used in a single experimental session with
same participants; yet outcomes from diﬀerent tasks are then
typically divided into separate research reports. There is a need
for a more systematic selection of tasks driven by contemplative
science theory so that these assessments would systematically
target the core elements of the MSRC. In addition, separate
reports of ﬁndings from the same participants should make
the links across such studies clear to enable integration of
ﬁndings across assessments. Comparison and consideration of
broader implications of ﬁndings across experiments with the
same participants could be instrumental in building a more
comprehensive and integrated picture of modulations in MSRC
with contemplative practices.
The proposed framework of contemplative science
also necessitates an expansion of the methodological and
theoretical scope of contemplative research to include
motivational/intentional and contextual modulators of processes
and outcomes. Currently, studies on motivational/intentional
(e.g., Shapiro, 1992) and contextual factors (Christopher et al.,
2009) are very scarce. Further research will require development
of assessment tools and experimental tasks which will particularly
target investigation of these factors in the contemplative
science context. This is because the available psychological
and neuroscientiﬁc tools are limiting in assessment of the
intentional/motivational and contextual aspects of contemplative
practices since the dimensions of these factors (e.g., intention
for liberation from suﬀering, spiritual transcendence, broader
philosophical context, secular or religious context, etc.) have
not been suﬃciently investigated in the more established
disciplines. Some of the new methods will need to build closely
on traditional contemplative theories and anthropological
methods applied to examine cultural, philosophical, and societal
dimensions of contemplative practices. As a result, future
studies in contemplative science will, hopefully, meaningfully
combine psychological and neuroscientiﬁc methods with
philosophical, anthropological, and traditional contemplative
theories and methods as a rule, rather than as an exception.
At the current stage, it would be advantageous if each study
included, at minimum, a clear description of instructions
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used in a contemplative practice studied, outline of processes
(psychological or cognitive) the practice aims to modify, and
outcomes the practice aims to produce within a particular
contemplative context (see section “Deﬁnitions of Mindfulness
and Other Contemplative Practices” for more details).
It has been repeatedly emphasized that ﬁrst-person
methodologies need to play an essential role in research
on meditation (Varela et al., 1991; Lutz, 2002; Nielsen and
Kaszniak, 2007). Neurophenomenological approach suggesting
integration of immediate ﬁrst-person introspective input and
third-person neurocognitive data in experimental tasks (e.g.,
Lutz, 2002) has been proposed as a possible methodological
solution. Yet, this recommendation has been rarely followed in
empirical research. One of the reasons might be the complexity
of neurophenomenology and lack of examples which would
encourage others to apply the same approach. It is also possible
that in the absence of a clear deﬁnition of contemplative science
which would stipulate the central standing of ﬁrst-person
methodologies in the discipline, the research easily bypassed
this ‘methodological complication.’ The proposed framework
of contemplative science further highlights the primary
methodological importance of ﬁrst-person methodologies in
contemplative research, particularly due to its emphasis on the
intrinsically phenomenological nature of shifts in MEA. It also
raises the question whether these phenomenological shifts can
be reliably investigated with available introspective methods,
including neurophenomenology.
Standard qualitative methods such as interviews or diaries
analyzed using traditional qualitative methods (e.g., thematic
analysis, interpretative phenomenological analysis, discourse
analysis, etc.) may not be most suitable to investigate shifts
in MEA. This is due to the intrinsically private and unique
nature of the experiential shifts associated with MEA which
would be subject to morphing and reshaping by an ‘outsider’
interpreter without access to the primary phenomenological
data. Temporal delay in descriptions and interpretation of
such states can be another source of misrepresentation (e.g.,
Schooler, 2002). The neurophenomenology approach is a step
forward in this regard because it highlights the importance of
temporal accuracy of reports and involvement of meditators
as collaborators in contemplative science research. However,
the neurophenomenological approach is speciﬁcally suited for
lab investigations with experimental tasks, and there is also a
need for methods which would enable capturing MEA as traits
manifesting in real life, outside of experimental environment.
There is a need for new methods which would invite
phenomenological report and self-interpretation by the
participant herself, inside and outside of experimental
environment, and without a temporal delay. An example
of one possible methodological approach satisfying such
requirements is the SenseMaker8, but it is yet to be seen
to what extent this approach is applicable in contemplative
science. Second-person methods can also play a pivotal role
in MEA research since meditation experts, based on their
personal extensive experience with MEA, are best positioned
8http://cognitive-edge.com
to provide an informed ‘outsider’ interpretative input. And
even approaches relying on self-interpretation of ﬁrst-person
data and on second-person expert data need to acknowledge
the inevitably indirect nature of ﬁndings resulting from any
research method which attempts to describe non-conceptual
MEA in words or other conceptual format. Overall, the unique
standing of contemplative science amongst other disciplines
could be strengthened if its research followed a stronger theory-
driven interdisciplinary approach which eﬀectively integrates
evaluations using psychological and neuroscientiﬁc methods
with assessments of motivational/intentional and contextual
factors, and ﬁrst-/second-person methods whilst acknowledging
their limitations.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED
DEFINITION
Definitions of Mindfulness and Other
Contemplative Practices
In the secular context of mindfulness-based approaches (MBAs –
including MBSR and MBCT), mindfulness is most commonly
deﬁned as ‘the awareness that emerges through paying attention
on purpose, in the present-moment, and non-judgmentally
to the unfolding of experience moment by moment’ (Kabat-
Zinn, 2003, p. 145). Further considerations building on this
deﬁnition operationalized mindfulness in terms of attention
and attitude (emotion qualities of openness, curiosity, non-
judgment, etc.) as its two main components (Bishop et al., 2004).
Shapiro et al. (2006) added to these two components a third
one – intention of mindfulness practice. Finally, in one of the
most recent deﬁnitions, mindfulness was speciﬁed as developing
self-awareness, SR, and self-transcendence (S-ART, Vago and
Silbersweig, 2012). These deﬁnitions will now be considered
further in the context of the outlined contemplative science
framework.
From the perspective of the proposed framework, the
deﬁnition by Kabat-Zinn seems to equate secular mindfulness
with a particular type of awareness, but the deﬁnition does
not specify further characteristics of this state. In the literature
on MBAs, the reference to awareness has been used in varied
connotations, ranging from simple noticing of the contents
and processes of mind to states of decentering from them
(e.g., metacognitive insight in Teasdale et al., 2002) and
self-transcendence (Vago and Silbersweig, 2012). Across these
diﬀerent meanings, changes in awareness seem to be consistently
considered as outcomes of mindfulness training. Such changes
could be examined and further speciﬁed in terms of the
progression in MEA with contemplative training. It seems that
training inMBAsmay speciﬁcally result in the initial modulations
of MEA associated with decentering; it is not clear though
whether MBAs can enable progression onto further stages of
MEA.
It is also not clear whether the changes in awareness are
the sole result of the mindfulness training as part of MBAs,
or whether they are cumulative outcomes of mindfulness
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practices and other aspects of training in MBAs – such as
implicit development of self-compassion, group therapy eﬀects,
acceptance elements of practices, etc. The literature has so
far been mostly equating the eﬀects of mindfulness with the
eﬀects of the MBAs. It would certainly be expected that
the eﬀects of mindfulness developed in MBAs and eﬀects of
MBAs as multifaceted interventions, would be overlapping, but
future research may reveal that their underlying mechanisms
and outcomes are somewhat diﬀerent. It is also up to future
studies to investigate whether, in the secular context, the
changes in decentering are speciﬁc to MBAs, or whether
they can be cultivated through other secular contemplative
practice programs, particularly those targeting development of
compassion and self-compassion.
While changes in awareness with training in MBAs can
be considered their outcomes, the processes of mindfulness
are typically described in terms of attention and emotion
regulation. This is exempliﬁed by the reference to the
present-moment attention with a non-judgmental attitude in
the Kabat-Zinn deﬁnition; the deﬁnitions by Bishop et al.
(2004) and Shapiro et al. (2006) speciﬁcally single out
attention and attitude as the core components of mindfulness.
According to the proposed conceptualization of contemplative
science, metacognition/attention and emotion are the essential
aspects of the MSRC of the mind. However, this framework
postulates that all contemplative practices modify the MSRC,
yet they diﬀer in terms of speciﬁc patterns of resulting
changes in the components of the MSRC (see section “The
Metacognitive Self-Regulatory Capacity of the Mind” for
examples). The distinctive features of mindfulness developed
in MBAs likely relate to developing metacognitive awareness
(noticing) of mental contents and processes, enhancement of
attentional stability and cultivation of the attitude of non-
reactivity.
Alongside attention and emotion processes, secular
mindfulness deﬁnitions also highlight the importance of
intention to the mindfulness practice. Kabat-Zinn (2003)
refers to this in his deﬁnition by the phrase ‘on purpose’
and Shapiro et al. (2006) explicitly named intention as one
of the three components of mindfulness in MBAs. Vago
and Silbersweig (2012) also included intention as one of
the components of mindfulness and discussed its relation to
motivation. However, the postulated framework of contemplative
science considers motivational/intentional factors as non-
speciﬁc to a particular practice, impacting on processes and
outcomes of any contemplative practice. This implies that
inclusion of intention-related components (just like awareness-
related outcomes) in deﬁnitions of mindfulness needs to be
practice-speciﬁc, indicating how the intention in mindfulness
practice within MBAs would be similar or diﬀerent from
the motivational/intentional factors in other contemplative
practices.
Based on the postulated deﬁnition of contemplative science,
contemplative practices need to be speciﬁed in terms of the
modulations of MSRC and MEA they induce together with their
motivational/intentional and contextual factors (in addition to
speciﬁc instructional descriptions of the techniques themselves).
In line with this approach, mindfulness in the context of MBAs
could be deﬁned as a form of mental training aiming to enhance
the MSRC of the mind, particularly targeting the development
of attention control and metacognitive awareness of mental
phenomena together with cultivation of an attitude of non-
reactivity. Through development of the MSCM, mindfulness
also creates basic conditions for initial shifts in MEA termed
in the MBA context as decentering. Importantly, such shifts
in MEA are not to be equated with mindfulness because they
also require facilitation by processes and qualities developed
through other contemplative practices such as those training in
compassion and loving kindness, etc., supporting expansion of
motivational/intentional factors, and deepening contemplative
insight.
Based on this deﬁnition of mindfulness, the primary
aim of secular mindfulness-based approaches could be
described as training in mindfulness as a meditation technique
enhancing introspective awareness and attention together
with non-reactivity. Development of further emotional and
intentional qualities through mindfulness-based approaches
depends on inclusion of other, mindfulness non-speciﬁc,
teacher qualities, and contemplative practices in the courses,
e.g., those supporting implicit and explicit cultivation of
kindness, compassion, etc., together with indirect support
of motivational/intentional modiﬁcations. Core mindfulness
training combined with further contemplative practices and
self-reﬂective inquiry may result in initial shifts in MEA such
as decentering from mental phenomena. More advanced
shifts in MEA most likely need to be facilitated by additional
contemplative training, typically within an established traditional
contemplative system which can provide targeted training in
a progression of practices (including further development of
motivational/intentional factors) aimed at facilitating deep
contemplative insight.
Interestingly, the deﬁnition of mindfulness applied in MBAs
is diﬀerent from some traditional deﬁnitions of mindfulness
in the Buddhist context. The latter often deﬁne mindfulness
(Pa¯li: sati; Sanskrit: smr.ti; Tibetan: drenba) as a mental
faculty enabling holding (recollection) and sustaining of focus
on a meditation object (breath, sacred statue, etc.; e.g.,
Wallace, 1999a; Dorjee, 2013). Mindfulness is here distinguished
from introspective meta-awareness (Pa¯li: sampajañña; Sanskrit:
samprajanya; Tibetan: shéshyin) which enables monitoring
of attention focus and noticing distractions (Wallace, 1999a;
Dorjee, 2013). In some of these descriptions mindfulness is
considered a neutral faculty (Thera, 1998) and in others a
positive (virtuous) one when applied in conjunction with other
qualities (e.g., Olendzki, 2008). Enhancements in mindfulness
are not suﬃcient for shifts in MEA, these would arise only
in combination with further training in emotional qualities of
loving kindness, compassion, rejoicing, and equanimity coupled
with development ofmotivational/intentional factors. So in terms
of the proposed conceptualizations of contemplative science,
mindfulness in this context would be selectively enhancing some
aspects of MSRC, mostly attention processes, without signiﬁcant
implications forMEA or involvement ofmotivational/intentional
factors.
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Much of previous discussion in the literature on deﬁnitions
of mindfulness (e.g., Williams and Kabat-Zinn, 2013) was
about ﬁnding the ‘right’ deﬁnition for the term. However,
the diﬀerences in deﬁnitions of mindfulness highlighted here
in the context of the proposed framework of contemplative
science suggest that rather than striving for ‘the correct
and unanimous’ deﬁnition of mindfulness, it might be more
productive to focus on accurate descriptions of speciﬁc
contextualized meanings of the term mindfulness. The same
principle holds for deﬁnitions of other contemplative practice.
Accordingly, the associated terminological and conceptual
confusions might be greatly minimized, if the similarities and
diﬀerences of varied deﬁnitions of contemplative practices
are clearly presented via comprehensive systematic deﬁnitions.
Within the proposed framework, such deﬁnitions should include
(1) clear instructional descriptions of how the practice is done; (2)
outline of motivational/intentional and contextual factors of the
practice; (3) expected pattern of MSRC modulations (including,
metacognition, attention, emotion regulation, and conceptual
processing); and (4) expected modulations in dereiﬁcation
processes associated with distinct MEA. Such deﬁnitions would,
for example, make it clear how mindfulness cultivated in
MBAs diﬀers from other conceptualizations of mindfulness in
the Buddhist context, and also enable comparisons between
modulations resulting from diﬀerent types of mindfulness
training and other contemplative practices.
Contemplative Science in Broader
Scientific Context
A clear and uniquely distinctive interdisciplinary methodological
approach of contemplative science is also likely to highlight its
potential for making a pioneering contribution to psychological
and neuroscientiﬁc research. Of particular broad interest in
this regard might be focused investigation of the interplay
between motivational/intentional factors, metacognitive SR,
MEA, and well-being outcomes. Such research could provide
new insights into psychological and neurocognitive mechanisms
underlying mental and physical health with strong implications
for prevention and treatment.
In addition, advancements in introspective methodologies,
and in their integration with behavioral and neurocognitive
assessments, may contribute to a broader methodological shift
in psychological and neuroscientiﬁc research, possibly providing
new insights into some of the most persistently challenging
topics including the theory of mind and the nature of
conscious experience. Furthermore, the constructs of MSRC
and MEA, while speciﬁcally targeted in contemplative training
and hence essential in contemplative science research, are
themselves non-restricted to the discipline and as such of
potential relevance, for instance, in developmental, education
and consciousness research. In sum, contemplative science
deﬁned as an interdisciplinary ﬁeld of study of the MSRC
and MEA modulated by motivational/intentional and contextual
factors has a strong potential to enrich psychological and
neuroscientiﬁc research through its unique theoretical and
empirical investigations.
Recommendations for Future Research
in Contemplative Science
The main challenges of meditation research have been recently
extensively discussed by Davidson and Kaszniak (2015) and
also previously considered by others (e.g., Davidson, 2010;
Desbordes and Negi, 2013; Tang et al., 2015). Assessment of ﬁrst-
person experiential aspects has been their central theme with
the neurophenomenological approach proposed as a solution.
Other persistent methodological challenges include measuring
constructs such as mindfulness and the need for more rigor in
research designs applied in the ﬁeld, including more clarity and
detail in descriptions of contemplative practices and participant
samples (Davidson and Kaszniak, 2015). Less often highlighted,
but equally important, is the lack of replication of ﬁndings which
diminishes the weight and implicational strength of meditation
research ﬁndings, particularly those from experimental and
neuroscientiﬁc investigations.
In addition to these essential methodological
recommendations, the proposed framework of contemplative
science highlights four further recommendations which could
contribute to advancement of contemplative science theory and
empirical research on meditation: (1) systematic comprehensive
deﬁnitions of contemplative practices including instructional
descriptions, speciﬁcation of intentional/motivational and
contextual factors of the practice, outline of processes of MSRC
targeted by the practice and expected impact of the practice on
dereiﬁcation processes and MEA (see section “Contemplative
Science in Broader Scientiﬁc Context”); (2) development of
comprehensive theory specifying MEA and their associations
with processes of the MSRC, motivational/intentional and
contextual factors; (3) reﬁnement of the neurophenomenology
approach and development of further ﬁrst-person and second-
person methods to capture phenomenological experience
through self-interpretation or expert-interpretation without
temporary delay (see section “Research Methodology of
Contemplative Science”) and their systematic inclusion in
empirical research on meditation; (4) targeted investigation
of same underlying cognitive mental constructs across studies
and variety of contemplative practices to enable development
of an overarching contemplative science theory integrating
ﬁndings and guiding further systematic research. As with the
methodological suggestions outlined previously (Davidson and
Kaszniak, 2015), the main challenge for the ﬁeld of contemplative
science remains in translating such recommendations into actual
research practice.
Limitations of the Proposed Framework
of Contemplative Science
The core intention behind the proposed framework is to support
systematic investigation of contemplative practices across
contemplative traditions. The main limitation of the framework
in its current form is that, despite its broad applicability intent, it
is mostly based on understanding of the progression of practices
in the Buddhist context (with some aspects particularly inspired
by the Tibetan Buddhist tradition of Dzogchen) and in secular
MBAs. Such approach seems unavoidable at the current stage
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of research in meditation given that majority of previous studies
focused on Buddhist meditation and its secular applications,
thus creating a basis for further contemplative research. Future
theoretical and empirical research on contemplative practices in
non-Buddhist traditions will determine the extent to which the
framework is suitable for investigations in contemplative science
more broadly as intended. Another limitation of the proposed
framework in its current form is its speciﬁcation in overarching
terms which needs to be further reﬁned in future theoretical
and empirical research (e.g., involvement of speciﬁc attention
processes and networks, detailed discussion about metacognitive
aspects of contemplative practices, reﬁnement of the progression
of MEA, etc.). Some of these limitations will, hopefully, be
addressed in further research which this paper aimed to stimulate.
CONCLUSION
This paper outlined one possible deﬁnition of contemplative
science and its subject as a means of addressing some persistent
challenges in current research of contemplative practices such
as terminological and deﬁnitional confusions and theoretical
limitations. It has been suggested that contemplative science can
be deﬁned as an interdisciplinary study of the MSRC of the mind
and MEA with both modulated by motivational/intentional and
contextual factors of contemplative practices. Advantages of the
proposed deﬁnition for guiding further systematic research have
been discussed together with possible implications for deﬁnitions
of mindfulness and other practices. It has been suggested that
the outlined framework could make research in contemplative
science more inclusive of varied contemplative practices and
enable contemplative science to harness more fully its potential
in making a unique contribution to psychological, cognitive
science, and neuroscientiﬁc research. The paper highlighted that
meditation research seems to be moving into a more mature
scientiﬁc phase, where considerations of its key theoretical and
deﬁnitional issues need to take a central stage to enable its further
advancement.
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